UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-5-2017

State v. Coats Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44872

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Coats Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44872" (2017). Not Reported. 4207.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4207

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 44872
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-5674
v.
)
)
SHAWN JERRI COATS,
)
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555

JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 5
I. The State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Mr. Coats
Committed Grand Theft Of Retail Goods Or Services During A
Criminal Episode ............................................................................................................. 5
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................................................... 5
C. No Evidence Showed Mr. Coats Stole Retail Goods Or Services
From Walmart Or Mr. Morgan.................................................................................. 6
II. Mr. Coats’s Convictions And Punishments For Grand Theft Of Retail
Goods Or Services During A Criminal Episode And Fraudulent Use
Of A Financial Transaction Card Violated His Right To Be Free Of
Double Jeopardy ............................................................................................................ 11
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 11
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................................................. 11
C. The Crimes Of Grand Theft And Fraudulent Use Of A Financial
Transaction Card Were The Same Offense And Thus In Clear
Violation Of Mr. Coats’s Unwaived Constitutional Right To
Be Free From Double Jeopardy................................................................................ 12
1. Mr. Coats’s Unwaived Constitutional Right To Be Free From
Double Jeopardy Was Violated Because Two Punishments
Were Imposed For The Same Offense ................................................................ 12
2. The Error Is Clear And Obvious From The Record ............................................ 15
3. The Error Is Not Harmless ................................................................................. 16
i

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 17
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................................. 18

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994) ....................................................................................... 12
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986).......................................................................................... 13
State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293 (1960) ............................................................................... 13, 16
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368 (Ct. App. 2011) .................................................................. 12, 15
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542 (2015) ........................................................................................5
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011) ........................................................................................ 13
State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63 (1963) ...............................................................................................13
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111 (1979)................................................................................ 13
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619 (Ct. App. 2001) ...................................................................... 12
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837 (2013) ............................................................................ 13, 15
State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654 (Ct. App. 2014) ..................................................................... 13, 16
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ................................................................................... 12, 16
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58 (Ct. App. 2000) .........................................................................11
State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79 (2016) ........................................................................ 12, 13, 15
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009) ......................................................................................5
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003).......................................................................................5
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782 (2017) ...........................................................................................5
State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48 (1969) ............................................................................................5
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430 (1980) ............................................................................ 13, 16

Statutes
I.C. § 18-2403 ........................................................................................................................ 2, 6
I.C. § 18-2407 ......................................................................................................................... 2, 6
iii

I.C. § 18-2409 .............................................................................................................................2
I.C. §§ 18-3125(4), -3128............................................................................................................2
I.C. § 18-3601 .............................................................................................................................2
I.C. § 19-2312 ........................................................................................................................... 16
I.C. § 19-2514 .............................................................................................................................2

Constitutional Provisions
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13 .......................................................................................................... 12

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Shawn Jerri Coats guilty of three counts of grand theft, three counts of
forgery, and one count of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card. The district court
imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. Mr. Coats raises two issues
on appeal. First, he contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt one of the
charges of grand theft because the evidence was insufficient to prove Mr. Coats stole retail goods
or services from the owner. Second, he asserts this contested count of grand theft arose from the
same factual circumstances as the charge of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card such
that one offense was the means of committing the other. These two convictions and punishments
for the same offense violated his right to be free from double jeopardy under the Idaho
Constitution. In light of these errors, Mr. Coats respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May of 2016, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Coats committed
multiple counts of grand theft, forgery, and criminal possession of a transaction card. (R., pp.14–
17; see also R., pp.52–55 (Amended Complaint).) These allegations arose out of Mr. Coats’s
purported use of Theodore (Ted) Morgan’s debit card to deposit fraudulent checks, withdraw
cash, and buy items from Walmart and Fred Meyer in a five-day period from June 28, 2015, to
July 2, 2015. (R., pp.14–17.) The magistrate court held a preliminary hearing, and Mr. Coats was
bound over to the district court. (R., pp.49–51, 56–59.) Ultimately, the State charged Mr. Coats
with eight offenses:
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Count 1: Grand theft (I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b)(3), -2409) for wrongfully
taking a financial transaction card from Theodore Morgan on or between June 28,
2015, and July 2, 2015;
Count 2: Grand theft (I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(b)(1), -2409) for wrongfully
taking over $1,000 in cash from Theodore Morgan on or between June 29, 2015,
and July 1, 2015;
Count 3: Forgery (I.C. § 18-3601) for a check on Kent Stevens’s account payable
to Ted Morgan in the amount of $975.00 to Mountain American Credit Union on
June 29, 2015;
Count 4: Forgery (I.C. § 18-3601) for a check on Kent Stevens’s account payable
to Ted Morgan in the amount of $990.00 to Mountain American Credit Union on
June 29, 2015;
Count 5: Grand theft (I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(b)(9), -2409) for wrongfully
taking retail goods or services with an aggregate value over $50, stolen during
three or more incidents, in a criminal episode up to three days, from the owner
Theodore Morgan and/or Walmart, on or between June 29, 2015, and June 30,
2015;
Count 6: Forgery (I.C. § 18-3601) for a check on Linda Glass’s account payable
to Ted Morgan in the amount of $995.00 to Mountain American Credit Union on
June 29, 2015;
Count 7: Criminal possession of a financial transaction card (I.C. §§ 18-3125(4),
-3128) for knowingly obtaining goods and/or property from Walmart by using a
fraudulently obtained financial transaction card on or between June 29, 2015, and
June 30, 2015; and
Count 8: Criminal possession of a financial transaction card (I.C. §§ 18-3125(4),
-3128) for knowingly obtaining goods and/or property from Fred Meyer by using
a fraudulently obtained financial transaction card on June 30, 2015.
(R., pp.64–67 (Information), 123–25 (Amended Information.) The State also charged Mr. Coats
as a persistent violator of the law under I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.89–90.) Mr. Coats pled not guilty
and exercised his right to a jury trial. (R., p.69.)
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The district court held a three-day jury trial. (Tr. Vol. I,1 p.15, L.5–p.148, L.9; Tr. Vol. II,
p.20, L.1–p.289, L.21.) The jury found Mr. Coats guilty of Counts 1 through 7. (R., pp.185–91.)
They found him not guilty of Count 8 (criminal possession of a financial transaction card for
using the fraudulently obtained card at Fred Meyer). (R., p.192.) (See also Tr. Vol. II, p.245,
L.25–p.249, L.10.) The district court then conducted a second part of the trial for the State’s
persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.250, L.12–p.278, L.21.) The jury
found Mr. Coats had been convicted of two or more felonies for purposes of the enhancement.
(R., p.196; Tr. Vol. II, p.275, L.25–p.277, L.12.) The district court sentenced Mr. Coats to fifteen
years, with five years fixed, for each of the seven counts, to be served concurrently. (R., pp.199–
202; Tr. Vol. II, p.299, L.11–p.300, L.10.) Mr. Coats timely appealed from the district court’s
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.204–05.)

1

There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a pretrial conference
and day one of the trial, both held on November 30, 2016. The second, cited as Volume II,
contains another pretrial conference, held on November 15, 2016, a motion hearing, held on
November 22, 2016, days two and three of the trial, held on December 1 and 2, 2016, and two
sentencing hearings, held on January 24 and February 14, 2017.
3

ISSUES
I.

Did the State fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Coats committed grand theft of
retail goods or services during a criminal episode?

II.

Did Mr. Coats’s convictions and punishments for grand theft of retail goods or services
during a criminal episode and fraudulent use of a financial transaction card violate his
right to be free of double jeopardy?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Mr. Coats Committed Grand Theft Of
Retail Goods Or Services During A Criminal Episode

A.

Introduction
Mr. Coats contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he committed the

crime of grand theft by taking retail goods or services valued over fifty dollars in three or more
incidents of theft during a criminal episode (Count 5). In short, this was the wrong offense for
Mr. Coats’s alleged criminal conduct. The evidence was wholly insufficient to prove Mr. Coats’s
multiple purchases at Walmart with Mr. Morgan’s debit card satisfied the elements of grand
theft. Therefore, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for this
offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a
jury verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 285 (2003). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been
proven.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be based
primarily upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51
(1969), and “even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently
with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt,” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 712 (2009).

State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017).
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C.

No Evidence Showed Mr. Coats Stole Retail Goods Or Services From Walmart Or
Mr. Morgan
There are two relevant statutes for the grand theft offense charged in Count 5: I.C. § 18-

2403 and I.C. § 18-2407. The first statute outlines the crime of theft: “A person steals property
and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to
himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an
owner thereof.” I.C. § 18-2403(1). The second statute divides theft into two degrees (grand and
petit) and describes the particular grand theft charged here:
(b) A person is guilty of grand theft when he commits a theft as defined in this
chapter and when:
...
9. The property has an aggregate value over fifty dollars ($50.00) and is stolen
during three (3) or more incidents of theft during a criminal episode. For purposes
of this subparagraph a “criminal episode” shall mean a series of unlawful acts
committed over a period of up to three (3) days.
I.C. § 18-2407(b)(9). Here, the State charged Mr. Coats with committing this offense by:
That the Defendant, SHAWN TERRI COATS, on or between the 29th day of
June, 2015, and the 30th day of June, 2015 in the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
did wrongfully obtain retail goods or other services with an aggregate value over
$50, stolen three [sic] or more incidents of theft, which was stolen as part of a
criminal episode over a period of up to three days from the owner, Theodore
Morgan and/or Walmart, with the intent to appropriate to himself certain property
of another.
(R., p.124.) Similarly, the jury instruction stated:
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of Count V. Grand Theft, the
State must prove each of the following:
1. On or between June 29, 2015 and June 30, 2015;
2. in the State of Idaho;
3. the defendant, Shawn Jerri Coats, wrongfully obtained property described
as: retail goods or services;
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4. from an owner;
5. with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate the
property;
6. the property was taken during three or more incidents; and
a. the aggregate value of the property is over $50.00; and
b. the property was stolen during a series of unlawful acts committed
over a period of up to three days.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty of Grand Theft. If each of the above has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of
Grand Theft.
(R., p.175.) The jury was also instructed on the meaning of “intent to deprive” and “intent to
appropriate.” (R., p.170.) In addition, the jury was told: “An ‘owner’ of property is any person
who has a right to possession of such property superior to that of the defendant.” (R., p.171.)
On appeal, Mr. Coats contends the State failed to prove he committed this grand theft
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Coats’s sufficiency challenge centers on the elements
that (a) Mr. Coats wrongfully obtained property described as: retail goods or services; (b) from
an owner; and (c) the property was stolen during a series of unlawful acts. The evidence did not
show Mr. Coats stole retail goods or services from Walmart or Mr. Morgan.
Mr. Morgan testified that, on June 28, 2015, Mr. Coats agreed to “help him out” with
some money problems. (Tr. Vol. II, p.51, Ls.2–24.) Mr. Coats offered to write checks out to
Mr. Morgan. (Tr. Vol. II, p.51, L.25–p.52, L.5.) Mr. Coats and Mr. Morgan then went to an
ATM affiliated with Mr. Morgan’s bank, Mountain American Credit Union (“MACU”).
(Tr., p.50, Ls.6–22, p.52, L.18–p.53, L.23; State’s Exs.2–5 (surveillance footage at MACU
ATM).) Mr. Morgan deposited a check for $955.00 into his checking account with his debit card
at the ATM. (Tr., p.53, L.24–p.55, L.8; State’s Ex. 1 (Bank Statement, p.3); State’s Ex. 6
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(check).) The check was payable to Mr. Morgan from the account of Zacarias Garcia. (State’s
Ex. 6.) After the first deposit, Mr. Coats asked for $500.00, so Mr. Morgan deposited second
check for $950.00 (also payable to Mr. Morgan from Zacarias Garcia’s account) and withdrew
$500.00 in cash for Mr. Coats.2 (Tr. Vol. II, p.54, L.23–p.55, L.12; State’s Ex. 1 (Bank
Statement, p.3); State’s Ex. 7 (checks).) Later that evening, Mr. Morgan agreed to let Mr. Coats
borrow his truck for an errand. (Tr. Vol. II, p.56, L.18–p.57, L.18.) The next morning,
Mr. Morgan woke up and his truck was gone. 3 (Tr. Vol. II, p.57, L.19–p.58, L.3.) His debit card
was missing as well. (Tr. Vol. II, p.58, Ls.4–7.) Mr. Morgan testified that he did not authorize
Mr. Coats to possess, use, or purchase any items with his debit card. (Tr. Vol. II, p.59, L.23–
p.60, L.11.)
The Walmart purchases with Mr. Morgan’s debit card occurred over the following two
days, June 29 and 30, 2015. There were a total of nine purchases from Walmart. According to
the MACU investigator, the first Walmart purchase occurred at 5:21 a.m. on June 29. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.132, L.10–p.134, L.7.) The amount was $348.53. (State’s Ex. 1 (Bank Statement, p.3).) Then,
starting at 7:06 a.m., four more Walmart purchases occurred in the amounts of $504.00,
$503.00,4 $503.95, and $130.67. (Tr. Vol. I, p.137, L.17–p.38, L.8; State’s Ex. 1 (Bank
Statement, p.3–4).) No more Walmart purchases were made that day with Mr. Morgan’s debit

2

Mr. Coats was not charged with forgery for these two checks. Also, Mr. Morgan testified that
the checks were both for $995.00, but the bank statements, copies of the checks, and the MACU
fraud investigator’s testimony all show that the two checks were for $955.00 and $950.00,
respectively. (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, L.10–p.119, L.22 (MACU investigator testimony); State’s Ex. 1
(Bank Statement, p.3); State’s Exs. 6–7 (checks).)
3
Mr. Coats was not charged with any offense relating to the truck.
4
Relating to this second Walmart purchase of $503.00, the bank statement indicates a
“Withdrawal Adjustment POS” of a credit of $503.00 back into Mr. Morgan’s account. (State’s
Ex. 1 (Bank Statement, p.3).) The reason for this credit is not explored in the MACU
investigator’s testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, p.137, L.17–p.38, L.8.) For purposes of this argument,
Mr. Coats assumes the second purchase of $503.00 in fact occurred.
8

card. (See State’s Ex. 1 (Bank Statement, pp.3–4).) The next day, on June 30, another four
Walmart purchases occurred, starting at 8:31 a.m. (Tr. Vol. I, p.142, L.21–p.143, L.15.) The first
amount was $903.00 and the next three amounts were $503.00 each. (State’s Ex. 1 (Bank
Statement, p.4).) In addition to the MACU investigator’s testimony and Mr. Morgan’s bank
statement, two Walmart receipts from the store were admitted into evidence. (State’s Exs. 26–
27.) These receipts showed two separate purchases with the same debit card on June 29—a
purchase of a prepaid visa gift card for $503.95 at 7:14 a.m. and a purchase of a hair styler and
shaver for $30.67 plus $100.00 cash back at 7:22 a.m. (State’s Exs. 26–27.) Along with the two
store receipts, a customer receipt from Walmart found by Mr. Morgan also showed the 7:14 a.m.
purchase of the prepaid visa gift card. (State’s Ex. 31.) Further, video surveillance footage from
Walmart showed the same individual make these two June 29 purchases. (State’s Ex. 25.)
Finally, a still-shot image from one of Walmart’s entryway cameras showed the same individual
at the store’s entrance at 7:23 a.m. on June 29. (State’s Ex. 28.) A loss prevention/asset
protection employee from Walmart identified Mr. Coats as the individual in the surveillance
footage. (Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.5–22.) In total, the evidence showed a total of $4,402.15 (including
$100.00 cash back) in purchases from Walmart in nine transactions over two days with
Mr. Morgan’s debit card.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed
Mr. Coats used Mr. Morgan’s debit card without his permission to purchase retail goods or
services from Walmart. This, however, does not satisfy the elements of the charged crime of
grand theft. Mr. Coats did not “wrongfully obtain . . . retail goods or services” from the “owner,”
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Walmart or Mr. Morgan,5 which were “stolen” during a series of unlawful acts. Neither Walmart
nor Mr. Morgan was the victim of a theft of retail goods or services. Regardless of whether
Walmart or Mr. Morgan was the “owner” of the retail goods and services, the State’s evidence
was inadequate to prove the charged offense of grand theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, looking at Walmart as the owner, no retail goods and services were stolen from
Walmart. Walmart was paid in full for all of the purchases. There was no evidence that Walmart
did not receive the money for the retail goods or services or that Mr. Coats took any items out of
the store without paying for them. As the owner of the retail goods or services, Walmart did not
experience a theft. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to prove Mr. Coats wrongfully
obtained retail goods and services stolen during a criminal episode from the owner Walmart.
Second, substituting Mr. Morgan as the “owner” does not solve the State’s sufficiency
problem. Mr. Morgan did not own or even possess these retail goods or services. Again, they
were owned by Walmart, and Walmart received payment for the items. Since Mr. Morgan was
never the owner of the items, Mr. Coats did not wrongfully obtain retail goods and services from
Mr. Morgan stolen during a criminal episode. While Mr. Coats may have fraudulently used
Mr. Morgan’s debit card to pay Walmart for the retail goods and services, this conduct was not a
theft of the retail goods and services. Rather, this conduct fell squarely into the offense of
fraudulent use of a financial transaction card to knowingly obtain goods or other property—
conduct for which Mr. Coats was already charged in Count 7. See Part II (double jeopardy
claim). Thus, even when designating Mr. Morgan as the “owner,” the evidence fails to show
Mr. Coats committed the charged offense of grand theft.

5

The Amended Information states that “Theodore Morgan and/or Walmart” was the owner of
the “retail goods or other services.” (R., p.124.) The jury instruction refers only to “an owner.”
(R., p.175.)
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In light of this evidence, the State failed to prove the charged offense of grand theft in
Count 5 beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, Mr. Coats does not dispute that he used
Mr. Morgan’s debit card at Walmart to buy retail goods or services. But he did not commit grand
theft by doing so. Mr. Coats respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
for this offense (Count 5) due to insufficient evidence.

II.
Mr. Coats’s Convictions And Punishments For Grand Theft Of Retail Goods Or Services During
A Criminal Episode And Fraudulent Use Of A Financial Transaction Card Violated His Right To
Be Free Of Double Jeopardy
A.

Introduction
Mr. Coats asserts his right to be free from double jeopardy pursuant to the Idaho

Constitution was violated because he was convicted and punished twice for the same offense.
The charged crimes of grand theft of retail goods or services during a criminal episode (Count 5)
and fraudulent use of a financial transaction card (Count 7) were actually the same offense. The
multiple punishments for this one offense resulted in a clear violation of Mr. Coats’s unwaived
constitutional right, and the constitutional error was not harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
As a question of law, this Court exercises free review over whether a defendant’s

“prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed in jeopardy twice.”
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63 (Ct. App. 2000).
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C.

The Crimes Of Grand Theft And Fraudulent Use Of A Financial Transaction Card Were
The Same Offense And Thus In Clear Violation Of Mr. Coats’s Unwaived Constitutional
Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
Mr. Coats raises this double jeopardy challenge for the first time on appeal. As such, he

must demonstrate fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 225 (2010). The fundamental
error doctrine places the burden on the defendant to show the alleged error: “(1) violates one or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Id. at 228. Here,
Mr. Coats’s alleged error meets this test. First, the error violated his unwaived right under the
Idaho Constitution to be free from double jeopardy. Second, the error is clear the record and not
the product of a strategic or tactical decision. Third, the error was not harmless because the error
affected Mr. Coats’s substantial rights and the outcome of the proceedings. Each prong of the
fundamental error test will be addressed below.

1.

Mr. Coats’s Unwaived Constitutional Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
Was Violated Because Two Punishments Were Imposed For The Same Offense

“The double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution states: ‘No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.’” State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 87 (2016) (quoting
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13). “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho and United States
Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,
and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.” State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370
(Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001)). The third type of protection—against multiple punishments for
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the same offense—is at issue here. Under Idaho’s double jeopardy clause, “a defendant may not
be convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense.” Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87 (quoting
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013)). Punishment for both the lesser and greater
included offense violates the Idaho Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434–35 (1980)).
Under the Idaho Constitution, the appellate courts use the pleading theory “to determine
whether one offense is a lesser-included offense of the other.” Id. at 658 (citing Thompson, 101
Idaho at 434–35). “This theory holds ‘that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the
information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.’”
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 211 (1986)). “Under this pleading theory, a court must consider whether the terms of
the charging document allege that both offenses arose from the same factual circumstances such
that one offense was the means by which the other was committed.” Moad, 156 Idaho at 658
(citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841; State v. McCormick, 100
Idaho 111, 115 (1979); State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960)). “An ‘included offense’ is
one which is necessarily committed in the commission of another offense; or one, the essential
elements of which are charged in the information as the manner or means by which the offense
was committed.” Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)).
Here, Mr. Coats was charged with two offenses arising from the same factual
circumstances. 6 The Amended Information for grand theft of retail goods or services during a

6

Mr. Coats does not concede or waive his sufficiency of the evidence argument in Part I. In
raising this double jeopardy issue, Mr. Coats considers how the offense of grand theft was
committed, but only for the purpose of showing the violation of his double jeopardy rights under
the pleading theory.
13

criminal episode (Count 5) and fraudulent use of a financial transaction card (Count 7) read:
COUNT V
That the Defendant, SHAWN TERRI COATS, on or between the 29th day of
June, 2015, and the 30th day of June, 2015 in the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
did wrongfully obtain retail goods or other services with an aggregate value over
$50, stolen three [sic] or more incidents of theft, which was stolen as part of a
criminal episode over a period of up to three days from the owner, Theodore
Morgan and/or Walmart, with the intent to appropriate to himself certain property
of another.
COUNT VII
That the Defendant, SHAWN TERRI COATS, on or between the 29th day of
June, 2015 and the 30th day of June, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
did, with the intent to defraud, knowingly obtain goods and/or property from
Walmart by the use of a fraudulently obtained financial transaction card.
(R., pp.124, 125.) The jury found Mr. Coats guilty of both offenses, and he was sentenced to
fifteen years, with five years fixed, for each offense, to be served concurrently. (R., pp.185–91,
199–202.)
Examining these two charges under the pleading theory, Mr. Coats’s fraudulent use of a
financial transaction card was the means or manner by which he committed the offense of grand
theft. Over the span of two days, Mr. Coats used a financial transaction card at Walmart (Count
7) to obtain retail goods or services from Walmart and/or Mr. Morgan (Count 5). In order to
commit the theft of Walmart and/or Mr. Morgan’s retail goods or services, Mr. Coats must have
used the financial transaction card at Walmart. Thus, under the pleading theory, fraudulent use of
a financial transaction card is a lesser included offense of grand theft.
Alternatively, grand theft is a lesser included offense of fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card, based on the pleading in this case. Mr. Coats’s theft of the retail goods or
services was the means or manner by which he committed the offense of fraudulent use of the
financial transaction card. Again, over the span of two days, Mr. Coats stole retail goods or
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services from Walmart and/or Mr. Morgan, and this theft was necessarily committed in
Mr. Coats’s use of the financial transaction card. In order to fraudulently use the transaction card
at Walmart, Mr. Coats must have wrongfully obtained the retail goods and services from
Walmart and/or Mr. Morgan.
Both offenses are entirely based on the same factual predicate of Mr. Coats’s use of
Mr. Morgan’s debit card to purchase retail goods or services at Walmart. “The language used in
both counts lays out the same factual circumstances as the basis for each offense.” Corbus, 151
Idaho at 375. Once Mr. Coats wrongfully obtained the retail goods and services, he committed
the fraudulent use of the financial transaction card, and vice versa—once Mr. Coats fraudulently
used the financial transaction card, he committed the grand theft. Either way, these crimes
merged into each other, and Mr. Coats was placed in double jeopardy by being prosecuted,
convicted, and punished for both. This was violation of his unwaived constitutional right under
the Idaho Constitution to be protected from double jeopardy. Mr. Coats submits he has met his
burden under the first prong of the fundamental error test.

2.

The Error Is Clear And Obvious From The Record

Mr. Coats also submits the second prong of the fundamental error test is satisfied. To
review a double jeopardy violation under the pleading theory, the appellate courts examine the
charging document: “[W]hether one crime is a lesser included offense of another crime can be
determined from the face of the record simply by reading the information charging each crime.”
Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87 (quoting McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841). As such, there is no need for
information outside of the record. Further, there is no tactical or strategic reason for trial counsel
to fail to object to a clear violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The right to be
protected from double jeopardy is so fundamental that is expressed in the Idaho Constitution, and

15

I.C. § 19-2312 codifies the pleading theory. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433–34 (discussing
I.C. § 19-2312); Anderson, 82 Idaho at 300–03 (same). Mr. Coats gained no tactical or strategic
advantage by being convicted and punished for the same offense twice. Additionally, there is no
indication trial counsel intentionally waived the double jeopardy violation. Thus, Mr. Coats
submits the error plainly exists.7

3.

The Error Is Not Harmless

Finally, Mr. Coats contends the third prong of the fundamental error test is met. Under
Perry, the defendant must show the error is not harmless, that is, “there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” 150 Idaho at 226. Here, the double
jeopardy violation affected the outcome because Mr. Coats was convicted, and subsequently
sentenced, for two offenses instead of one. He would have one less felony conviction—and one
less fifteen-year sentence—without the error. Therefore, Mr. Coats has shown the error harmed
him and affected his substantial rights to be free from double jeopardy. He respectfully requests
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for grand theft and fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card.

7

The case law on the pleading theory is also clearly established. Previously, there were some
inconsistencies regarding the pleading theory test (which, in 2011 in Corbus, the Court of
Appeals held foreclosed the defendant’s showing of a clear constitutional error under the
fundamental error standard), but the Idaho Supreme Court resolved the issue in McKinney.
State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014) (discussing Corbus and McKinney). Since
McKinney, the Court of Appeals has considered double jeopardy claims under the fundamental
error standard. See Moad, 156 Idaho at 657–61.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Coats respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for
grand theft (Count 5) due to insufficient evidence and remand this case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgments of conviction for grand
theft (Count 5) and fraudulent use of a financial transaction card (Count 7) due to the double
jeopardy violation and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2017.

_________/s/________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

17

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of October, 2017, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
SHAWN JERRI COATS
INMATE #79891
SICI
PO BOX 8509
BOISE ID 83707
RICHARD D GREENWOOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KYLE O SCHOU
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas

18

